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Fiscal Consolidation in Federal Belgium: Collective Action 




Fiscal consolidation confronts federal states with a collective action problem, especially in federations with a 
tightly coupled fiscal regime such as Belgium. However, the Belgian federation has successfully solved this 
collective action problem even though it lacks the political institutions that the literature on dynamic federalism 
has identified as the main mechanisms through which federal states achieve cooperation across levels of 
government. This article argues that the regionalization of the party system, on the one hand, and the 
rationalization of the deficit problem by the High Council of Finance, on the other, are crucial to understand how 
Belgium was able to solve the collective action problem despite its tightly coupled fiscal regime and particularly 
high levels of deficits and debts. The article thus emphasizes the importance of compromise and consensus in 
reducing deficits and debts in federal states. 
 





After decades of major increases in public spending and the expansion of government budgets 
in the second half of the 20th century, budget deficits widened and public debt skyrocketed 
in many developed countries across the world. Since the 1990s, and in some countries already 
since the 1980s, governments have been looking closely at the reduction of deficits and debts 
(Streeck, 2014; Wagschal & Wenzelburger, 2008, p. 5). Inspired by Public Choice Theory 
(Buchanan & Wagner, 1977), decision makers introduced fiscal rules1 as a mechanism of self-
constraint that would prevent them from overspending (Kopits & Symansky, 1998; 
Schaechter, Kinda, Budina & Weber, 2012; White, 2012).  
                                                      
* School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, Rutherford College, Canterbury CT2 7NX, 
United Kingdom. J.M.Schnabel@kent.ac.uk. 
1 Fiscal rules are numerical constraints on fiscal policy. They can consist of balanced-budget rules, debt rules, 
expenditure rules and revenue rules (Cottarelli & Guerguil, 2015). 
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In federal states such as Belgium, fiscal authority is distributed between (at least) two 
levels of government (Blöchliger & Kantorowicz, 2015). The constituent units enjoy fiscal 
autonomy, i.e. they collect revenues and decide on expenditures. Accordingly, the federation 
as a whole can be successful in consolidating the general government budget, i.e. the 
combined budget of the constituent units and the federal government, only if both levels of 
government reduce their deficits and debts. In other words, both the federated entities and 
the federal government have to introduce fiscal rules to ensure the solvency of the federation 
– be it in the form of joint fiscal rules or individual budget constraints. However, this 
cooperation cannot be taken for granted, especially in federations with a tightly coupled fiscal 
regime. On the one hand the constituent units can refuse to accept fiscal rules since they do 
not have to internalize the costs of fiscal indiscipline (Rodden, 2006; Rodden, Eskeland & 
Litvack, 2003; Treisman, 2007; Weingast, 2009). On the other hand the federal government 
may seek to impose a fiscal rule on the constituent units to enforce fiscal discipline. Therefore, 
fiscal consolidation may cause tensions between the two levels of government.  
The Belgian federation is subject to this collective action problem given its tightly 
coupled fiscal regime, the disastrous state of public finances (Hallerberg, 2000; IMF, 2011) and 
the salience of autonomy issues in a federation that is still searching for the right model to 
appease the structural conflict between two linguistic groups and a significant socio-economic 
cleavage dividing the country (Benz, 2016; Deschouwer, 2012). Nevertheless, Belgium has 
successfully solved the collective action problem regarding fiscal consolidation even though it 
lacks the mechanisms identified in the literature on dynamic federalism as preventing a 
federal government from imposing its decisions on the constituent units. These are a strong 
bicameral system, in which the second chamber represents territorial interests and enjoys 
powers symmetric to those of the lower house (Swenden, 2004) and an integrated and 
decentralized party system (Bednar, 2009; Hueglin & Fenna, 2015, pp. 205–237; Watts, 2008, 
p. 153). 
To explain how the collective action problem related to fiscal consolidation has been 
resolved in the Belgian federation, this article examines the development of annual fiscal 
targets and the decentralization of a share of the federal deficit in the latest state reform in 
2011. Annual fiscal targets, set for four to six years in advance and updated every year, 
constitute Belgium’s fiscal rule. By underfunding newly transferred responsibilities and 
through the Communities’ and Regions’ larger participation in funding the pensions of public 
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servants, the 2011 state reform decentralized a share of the federal deficit – which further 
restricts the constituent units’ discretion to spend. This case study relies on secondary 
literature, data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for 
Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD), public reports and newspaper articles. It 
draws on the literature on dynamic federalism (Bednar, 2009; Benz, 2016; Benz & Broschek, 
2013) that underlines the importance of balancing the federal distribution of power – and 
hence of the autonomy of the different governments within a federation – in order to 
maintain the stability of a federal system.  
The article shows that a regionalized party system and the delegation of the 
development of fiscal rules to an expert body (the High Council of Finance,2 HCF) constitute 
sufficient conditions to solve the collective action problem of reducing deficits and debts in a 
federal state with a tightly coupled fiscal regime such as Belgium. A regionalized party system 
can protect the constituent units from federal imposition in a similar way to strong 
bicameralism or integrated and decentralized parties. This has been overlooked by the 
literature on dynamic federalism. So far, research on the HCF has focused on its effectiveness 
with respect to the policy dimension, i.e. deficit rates and debt levels (Bethuyne, 2005; 
Bogaert, Dobbelaere, Hertveld & Lebrun, 2006; Hallerberg, 2000; Husson, 1997; Piron, 2013). 
This article, in contrast, concentrates on politics and the relations between federal actors. 
The next section addresses the collective action problem of fiscal consolidation in 
federal states, while Section 3 presents the mechanisms through which it can be solved. 
Section 4 explains why fiscal consolidation in the Belgian federation is subject to the collective 
action problem. Finally, Section 5 examines the development of fiscal targets and the 
dispositions of the sixth state reform to decentralize parts of the federal budget. It also 
analyzes how the HCF makes them acceptable to the Communities and the Regions.  
2 The Collective Action Problem of Fiscal Consolidation in Federal States 
In regard to fiscal consolidation in federal states, both levels of government need to cooperate 
to balance the general government budget. With regard to rules-based consolidation, this 
means that both levels of government should introduce fiscal rules – either jointly or 
individually. Fiscal rules limit all governments’ discretion to spend since they have to adjust 
                                                      
2 De Hoge Raad van Financiën in Dutch, Conseil Supérieur des Finances in French. 
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their revenues and expenditures. In general, however, federal governments benefit from 
higher revenues than the constituent units because they have access to major taxes and 
because they can freely borrow from the financial markets (Oates, 1999). Therefore, the 
constituent units can, in principle, count on federal assistance, notably in the form of bailouts 
should they experience a fiscal crisis (Rodden et al., 2003). Because of this possibility, the 
federated entities may be reluctant to introduce fiscal rules and accept these constraints on 
their discretion to spend. However, as the ultimate guarantor of general government debt and 
being responsible for the macroeconomic stability of the federation, the federal government 
faces incentives to impose a fiscal rule on the constituent units so as not to have to bail them 
out in the future. Fiscal consolidation thus confronts federal states with a collective action 
problem (see Braun & Tommasi, 2004; Weingast, 2009). 
Bednar (2009) has shown that the constituent units’ refusal to cooperate as well as 
federal imposition undermine the, often fragile, balance of power of federal systems (see also 
Braun, Ruiz-Palmero & Schnabel, 2017; de Figueiredo & Weingast, 2005; Weingast, 1995). 
With regard to fiscal consolidation, constituent units’ non-cooperation affects the federal 
government’s resources when it has to bail them out instead of spending on its own priorities. 
The imposition of a fiscal rule by the federal government undermines the constituent units’ 
autonomy. By imposing a fiscal rule on them, the federal government unilaterally sets limits 
to the constituent units’ discretion to spend. Hence, it indirectly decides how much they can 
spend. These asymmetric losses of autonomy threaten the federal balance of power, 
considering that autonomy and power are interlinked. Thus, they are likely to trigger 
contestations of those governments that see their autonomy or resources restricted by 
decisions of another government of the federation.  
The introduction of fiscal rules to consolidate public finances is more likely to produce 
asymmetric autonomy losses in federations with a tightly coupled (or integrated) fiscal regime 
compared with federations with a loosely coupled (or decentralized) fiscal regime (Eyraud & 
Gomez Sirera, 2015; Rodden et al., 2003; Rodden & Wibbels, 2002; Treisman, 2007). In loosely 
coupled fiscal regimes, the constituent units have to manage their finances on their own. As 
the constituent units have substantial taxing rights, which allow for lower transfer rates from 
the collective resources collected by the federal government, they have enough leeway to 
adjust their revenues. The federal government can thus refuse to bail them out. Hence, the 
constituent units have to internalize the costs of fiscal indiscipline (such as increasing interest 
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rates) to a much bigger extent than the federated entities in federations with tightly coupled 
fiscal regimes (Wibbels, 2005). In tightly coupled fiscal regimes, in contrast, a large percentage 
of revenues is shared. Federal transfers (including solidarity payments coming from fiscal 
equalization) constitute a significant share of constituent units’ revenues. Because their 
leeway to adjust their revenues is limited, it is more difficult for the federal government to 
refuse to bail them out or to provide other forms of financial support when they experience a 
fiscal crisis. As the constituent units can count on federal assistance, they have fewer 
incentives to commit to fiscal discipline (Fredriksen, 2011) because the costs of a fiscal crisis 
are not internalized (Plekhanov & Singh, 2014; Treisman, 2007). Because of this collective 
action problem, asymmetric autonomy losses resulting from fiscal consolidation, and the 
federal tensions they may trigger, can be expected mostly in federations with a tightly coupled 
fiscal regime. 
3 Solutions to the Collective Action Problem of Fiscal Consolidation in Federal 
States 
The collective action problem of fiscal consolidation is solved if the federal government 
refrains from imposing a fiscal rule on the constituent units, on the one hand, and when the 
constituent units accept the introduction of fiscal rules and the limits to their discretion to 
spend, on the other hand.  
With respect to limiting federal encroachment, Bednar (2009, pp. 98–103) identified a 
number of mechanisms that raise the federal government’s awareness for the interests of the 
federated entities. A bicameral system prevents the federal government from imposing 
decisions on the constituent units. Through the second chamber of the federal parliament, 
the constituent units can influence federal decision-making. They can veto federal policies 
that impose expenditures, decrease their revenues or that oblige them to reduce their deficits 
and debts (Hueglin & Fenna, 2015, pp. 205–237; Watts, 2008, p. 153). However, the 
constituent units have real influence on federal decision-making through the second chamber 
only if the upper house has the right to introduce, amend and veto ordinary and constitutional 
legislation in addition to representing the interests of the constituent units (Swenden, 2004). 
In Belgium, these requirements are not fulfilled. Even though territorial representation in the 
Belgian Senate was strengthened in 1993 and 2011, both reforms have significantly reduced 
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the powers of the second chamber, and the Senate cannot veto federal decision-making 
(Dandoy, Dodeigne, Reuchamps & Vandeleene, 2015; Deschouwer, 2012, pp. 182–184; 
Popelier, 2018; Sägesser & Istasse, 2014). Other mechanisms that give the constituent units a 
voice in federal decision-making are also non-existent, such as consultation procedures, 
through which the Swiss cantons can influence federal bills (Vatter, 2016), or an integrated 
and decentralized party system in which the regional branches are sufficiently influential to 
be able to leverage the national branches (Bednar, 2009, pp. 113–119; Filippov, Ordeshook & 
Shvetsova, 2004). In federal Belgium, the party system is disintegrated and regionalized 
(Deschouwer, 2012; Watts, 2008, p. 145). Consequently, it can be expected that the collective 
action problem of fiscal consolidation is not resolved since the federal government may 
impose a fiscal rule on the constituent units. 
However, Bednar’s argument ignores the possibility that a federal government can be 
composed of regional (or even regionalist) parties that participate in federal elections in one 
part of the country only (Brancati, 2008). If regional (or regionalist) parties form the federal 
government, strong partisan ties exist with the governments of the constituent units. 
Consequently, the federal government’s interests and preferences are likely to overlap with 
those of the constituent units. Decisions of the federal government are compromises of the 
regional parties composing the federal executive and parliament. This reduces the risk of 
federal imposition significantly, especially when governments are congruent across levels. In 
Belgium, statewide parties do not exist anymore (Deschouwer, 2012).3 Each party has Flemish 
and French-speaking branches that are completely independent of each other and sometimes 
even defend different positions with regard to policy issues. Thus, they effectively constitute 
different parties. Furthermore, regionalist parties have won seats in federal elections in 
Flanders (Deschouwer, 2012, pp. 148, 83–84; Watts, 2008, p. 145). Hence, regional and 
regionalist parties constitute the federal parliament and the federal executive. Following the 
principle of consociationalism, the latter is composed of an equal number of Dutch-speaking 
and French-speaking representatives (Deschouwer, 2006). Moreover, Belgium is a 
partitocracy where parties have significant influence on their representatives in government. 
For example, party leaders choose the ministers when coalition governments are formed, and 
these ministers’ decisions need to be confirmed by their parties (Deschouwer, 2012, pp. 78, 
                                                      
3 The only exception is the Parti du Travail de Belgique (PTB)/Partij van de Arbeit van België (PVDA). 
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151). What is more, until 2003, the same parties governed on the federal level, in the 
Communities and in the Regions (Deschouwer, 2006) so that ‘the parties forming a federal 
and a regional or community government [were] exactly the same’ (Deschouwer, 2012, p. 
161). While governments have become slightly less congruent since 2003, partisan ties 
between the federal government and the Regions and Communities have tended to be strong 
(Deschouwer, 2012, pp. 161–167; Deschouwer & Reuchamps, 2013)4 – at least until 2014, 
when government congruence declined further. The fact that the federal government is 
composed of regional(ist) parties has thus minimized the risk of federal imposition right from 
the start given that decisions of Belgium’s federal government with respect to the reduction 
of public deficits and debts are based on agreements of the regional parties constituting the 
federal government.  
While the regionalization of the party system prevents the imposition of budget 
constraints on the constituent units by the federal government, it does not ensure the 
participation of the former in fiscal consolidation. A fiscal rule must be acceptable to them if 
the constituent units are to cooperate. The literature on intergovernmental relations and 
multilevel governance suggests that this is the case if federal actors adopt a problem-solving 
mode of interaction instead of bargaining (Benz, 2016; Elgström & Jönsson, 2000; Panke, 
2006; Scharpf, 1988). Bargaining equals confrontations that are resolved through 
compromises that often require package deals because individual interests and preferences 
dominate. When governments of a federation agree on a fiscal rule through bargaining, the 
constituent units only give their consent if the federal government offers financial 
compensations in exchange for their agreement – but without really accepting the constraints 
on their budgets. Problem-solving, in contrast, builds consensus based on shared ideas and 
preferences so that all actors are ‘convinced that they will all benefit in the long run’ (Elgström 
& Jönsson, 2000, p. 688). Hence, the constituent units agree to constraints on their discretion 
to act not because the federal government lures them with financial compensations but 
                                                      
4 Note that while the combination of government congruence with a regionalized party system creates strong 
partisan ties between the two levels of government, conflicts between the two levels of government cannot be 
fully excluded – for example, when regional interests dominate over partisan issues. The constituent units may 
even decide to team up against the federal government to defend their collective interests. Nevertheless, it can 
be expected that such conflicts are eventually resolved through partisan channels.  
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because they share the idea that deficits and debts should be reduced through the 
introduction of fiscal rules.  
Focusing on constitutional reforms, Benz (2016) has identified institutional arenas 
consisting of experts or citizens as a mechanism in intergovernmental relations whereby 
consensus based on shared ideas and interests can be built through arguing. According to 
Benz, the separation of the arena in which policy decisions are negotiated from the arena in 
which these decisions are adopted increases their acceptability. With regard to fiscal 
consolidation, this condition is fulfilled if the budget constraints are not developed by the 
politicians who will have to respect them when making decisions on public revenues and 
expenditures. This is the case if experts in public finance develop the fiscal rules. The IMF 
recommends the establishment of fiscal councils consisting of experts in public finance to 
advise policymakers on fiscal policy (IMF, 2013). These councils, in basing their 
recommendations on expert advice, contribute to the emergence of the shared idea that fiscal 
discipline benefits all governments of a federation in the long run. Moreover, the reputation 
and independence of experts increase the disposition of policymakers to accept their advice 
even if it means that they have to make unpopular decisions (Van Meensel & Dury, 2008). 
Fiscal councils thus constitute an arena where arguing overtrumps the individual interests and 
preferences of the federal government and the constituent units. Consequently, the federated 
entities agree to limit their expenditures or increase their revenues not because they are the 
losers in bargaining processes but because they consider the constraints on their budgets to 
be ‘rational’ since they are recommended by experts. Furthermore, fiscal councils increase 
the transparency of fiscal policy. This increases the pressure on policymakers to prove their 
commitment to fiscal discipline. Therefore, Van Meensel and Dury (2008) conclude that fiscal 
councils help solve the collective action problem of fiscal consolidation in federal states. 
However, the IMF (2013) has identified four conditions that must be fulfilled for the 
rationalization of fiscal consolidation to be effective. First, fiscal councils must be 
independent. Second, they must have the mandate to produce budgetary forecasts. Third, 
they must be transparent and adopt a communication strategy. And, finally, fiscal councils 
must monitor the budgets of governments on both levels to ensure compliance with their 
recommendations.  
Since 1989, the HCF has developed annual fiscal targets for the different entities that 
constitute the Belgian federation (Piron, 2013, 2014). The HCF has existed since 1936. In 1989, 
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a Public Borrowing Requirements Section was created to develop the fiscal targets for the two 
levels of government.5 The Section consists of 12 experts of public finance.6 The HCF was 
mandated to monitor the finances of the constituent units when the third state reform (1989) 
transferred significant fiscal powers to the Regions and Communities and allowed them to 
borrow (Pagano, 2007). Members of the HCF cannot assume political office (Bethuyne, 2005; 
Pagano, 2007). 7  Furthermore, the HCF bases its recommendations on macroeconomic 
forecasts provided by the National Accounts Institute and the Federal Planning Bureau 
(Bogaert et al., 2006). Besides, it publishes its recommendations on its website in the three 
official languages as well as in English.8 Finally, the HCF monitors the compliance of the federal 
government’s budget and the budgets of the constituent units with the annual fiscal targets 
and evaluates whether or not they respect the Convergence/Stability Programmes that 
Belgium submits to the European authorities (Wagschal & Wenzelburger, 2008, p. 78). If the 
HCF concludes that the federal government or a federated entity might fail to meet the fiscal 
targets, it may request adjustments in the following year’s budget. Moreover, the HCF can 
advise the federal government to restrict the borrowing of the Regions and Communities. The 
HCF is thus a strong fiscal council that meets the conditions established by the IMF. 
Accordingly, fiscal rules are developed in an arena that is distinct from that in which they are 
adopted and implemented. The rationalization of fiscal consolidation through the HCF builds 
consensus on fiscal constraints, which is likely to make fiscal consolidation acceptable to the 
constituent units. Therefore, it can be expected that the Communities and Regions accept and 
respect fiscal rules and similar budget constraints.  
                                                      
5 Art. 49 of the Special Finance Act for the Communities and Regions from 16 January 1989. 
6  More precisely, the Section consists of six members nominated by the constituent units, three members 
designated by the federal government, as well as the governor, vice-governor and the senior director of the 
National Bank of Belgium. 
7 It is important to note that several aspects undermine the HCF’s independence, e.g. the location of the council’s 
secretariat at the federal ministry of finance, the fact that the federal minister of finance chairs the HCF, the 
nomination of its members by the different governments of the federation and the political background of some 
members (Coene & Langenus, 2013; Pagano, 2007). However, not only is the Public Borrowing Requirement 
Section largely autonomous within the HCF (Coene & Langenus, 2013), but it is also chaired by an expert in public 
finance. Besides, in the context of Belgian bipolarism, ‘it can be argued that impartiality can only be ensured 
through carefully balanced regional, institutional, linguistic, and political dimensions’ (Coene & Langenus, 2013, 
p. 144).  
8 https://www.conseilsuperieurdesfinances.be/fr [last access: 18.02.2019] 
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4 Belgium: A ‘Most Likely Case’ 
Not only does the Belgian federation have a tightly coupled fiscal regime, but the state 
of its public finances has also been particularly difficult since the 1980s. Furthermore, the 
linguistic and socio-economic cleavages dividing the country make autonomy a particularly 
sensitive issue. Hence, fiscal consolidation in Belgium is potentially subject to a collective 
action problem, and the constituent units may refuse to cooperate to reduce the deficits and 
debts of the federation while the federal government, to make them consolidate, may decide 
to impose a fiscal rule on them.  
As part of the federalization and decentralization of the country, fiscal autonomy has 
been transferred by and by, mainly to the Regions but also to the Communities, though it 
lagged behind the decentralization of law-making powers (Deschouwer, 2012, p. 69). The 
Special Finance Act for the Communities and Regions, adopted in 1989 as part of the third 
state reform, assigned the authority to raise a piggyback tax on the federal personal income 
tax and to collect a number of regional taxes to the Regions. In 1989, the constituent units 
also obtained the right to issue loans. Some loans require the formal approval of the federal 
government with regard to the conditions under which they are issued and the date of the 
loan. The federal government can also limit the borrowing rights of the Communities and 
Regions for two years upon recommendation of the HCF. With regard to the collective action 
problem, however, it is important to note that the use of this mechanism is politically 
infeasible; the federal government has thus never applied it (Bethuyne, 2005; Coene & 
Langenus, 2013). As part of the Fifth State Reform (2001), the Regions received the right to 
grant lump-sum reductions or increases on the piggyback tax as well as reductions on taxes 
related to regional responsibilities (Verdonck & Deschouwer, 2003). Finally, an amendment of 
the Special Finance Act in 2014, one of the outcomes of the sixth state reform adopted in 
2011, transferred 25% of the federal share of the federal income tax as own revenues to the 
Regions. They were assigned the right to define the level of their respective shares of the 
personal income tax. This increased the Regions’ own revenues to 70% of total regional 
revenues (Deschouwer, 2012, p. 71). Even though the different state reforms have moved 
Belgian federalism towards the loosely coupled type of fiscal regime, the fiscal consolidation 
that started in the 1980s took place in the context of an integrated fiscal regime, at least until 
2014, given the high transfer dependency of the constituent units (64.1% in 2005) and the low 
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share (10% in 2010) of their own revenues in their total revenues (Cottarelli & Guerguil, 
2015).9 Transfer dependency and own revenues of the constituent entities vary, and the 
Communities have always depended entirely on federal and regional support. Apart from a 
specific-purpose grant for foreign students, grants to the Communities are unconditional. 
Although the Regions dispose of an increasing share of own taxes as well as the piggyback tax 
on the federal personal income tax, they have also been rather dependent on federal transfers 
until the recent amendment of the Special Finance Act. They received a share of the personal 
income tax, an equalization grant, and some specific-purpose grants (mainly for 
unemployment policy) (Deschouwer, 2012; Verdonck & Deschouwer, 2003). Consequently, 
the leeway the Regions, and especially the Communities, had to adjust their revenues was 
limited.10 Moreover, implicit federal bailouts were granted in 1993, 2001 and 2013 (Jennes, 
2014). Amendments of the Special Finance Act in 1993 and 2001 increased (unconditional) 
federal grants to the Communities after the French Community was repeatedly running 
deficits, though mostly for structural reasons. In accordance with the way negotiations work 
in Belgium, Flanders received these extra grants as well. In 2013 the Brussels Region received 
an implicit bailout when it obtained additional (unconditional) grants after claiming that it 
would not be able to balance its budget without assistance from the federal government 
(Jennes, 2014, p. 27). While explicit bailouts are unlikely to occur given that federal grants are 
mostly non-discretionary, the fact that the Special Finance Act was amended several times to 
provide implicit bailouts suggests that the costs of overborrowing are not fully internalized, 
which may reduce the constituent units’ willingness to accept fiscal rules.  
In addition to Belgium’s tightly coupled fiscal regime, high levels of deficits and debts 
exacerbated the collective action problem of fiscal consolidation in the country (Hallerberg, 
2000). Public expenditures increased significantly between the 1960s and the late 1980s, from 
33% of GDP in 1965 to 50% of GDP in 1988. Subsidies to business, interest payments, the 
expansion of public-sector employment, as well as increasing transfers to households explain 
                                                      
9 Compared with 18.3% (transfer dependency) and 37.2% (own revenues) in the United States. Among the 
federations with a loosely coupled fiscal regime (Canada, Switzerland and the United States), the United States 
has the highest level of transfer dependency and the lowest level of own revenues of the constituent units 
(Cottarelli & Guerguil, 2015). 
10 Note that transfers to the Communities and Regions are non-discretionary since their amount and norms of 
distribution are defined in special majority laws. Consequently, the restrictions on the constituent units’ leeway 
to adjust their revenues do not mean that the federal government decides on these revenues unilaterally. 
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this expansion of public expenditures. Because of favourable interest rates in the 1970s, large 
parts of the increase in (federal) government expenditures were financed through borrowing 
(OECD, 1989). The recession caused by the 1979 oil crisis required considerable interventions 
from the federal government to fight unemployment (13% in 1983). As a consequence, public 
deficits (10% of GDP in 1988) and debt (125% of GDP in 1988) increased, triggering a rise in 
interest payments to more than 10% of GDP in 1988 (IMF, 2011). Belgium thus experienced a 
snowball effect, i.e. the (federal) government had to borrow to pay the interests on its debt. 
While the deterioration of public finances triggered a first round of fiscal consolidation (IMF, 
2011; OECD, 1989), Belgium still had a general government deficit of 8.4% of GDP in 1993, and 
general government debt exceeded 135% of GDP (IMF, 2011). Fiscal consolidation was needed 
because of the country’s eagerness to be a founding member of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) (Hallerberg, 2000; Piron, 2013), which obliged it to limit the deficit to 3% of GDP 
and public debt to 60% of GDP to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact. Besides, since 
1995, the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA) defines a European 
accounting framework fostering transparency in public budgets, on which the European Union 
bases its fiscal monitoring. The ESA distinguishes between the two levels of government,11 
and as a result both the federated entities and the federal government in Belgium were under 
pressure to keep their finances in order. What is more, the OECD had found in its annual 
reports that the country’s ageing population was bound to put considerable strain on future 
budgets (see, for example, OECD, 2005). Therefore, fiscal consolidation was also a strategy to 
manage the costs of the ageing society by prefunding future costs through budgetary 
surpluses that would free funds to be transferred to a public pension reserve fund (Silver Fund) 
established in 2001 (see Frogneux & Saintrain, 2013). 12  Despite significant consolidation 
efforts between 1992 and 2000, the state of public finances deteriorated during the global 
financial crisis (2007-2008) and the European sovereign debt crisis that followed. To save 
Belgium’s banking sector, the federal government recapitalized several banks (Fortis, Dexia, 
                                                      
11 Furthermore, the ESA treats social security and local government as separate budgetary entities. 
12  In 2016, the federal government abolished the Silver Fund after having failed, since 2007, to allocate 
contributions to the fund. The federal government decided to enact structural reforms instead, such as increasing 
the retirement age (to 67 years by 2030). Yet fiscal consolidation remains part of the federal government’s 
strategy to manage the ageing society. See https://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/economie/le-fonds-pour-faire-
face-au-papy-boom-n-existe-plus-comment-le-gouvernement-va-gerer-les-depenses-de-pensions-
supplementaires--888142.aspx [accessed on 14.11.2018] (see also Pacolet, 2016). 
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Ethias, KBC), which required investments of more than 5% of GDP (Eijffinger, 2010). 
Consequently, deficits and debts remained at alarming levels for several years when economic 
growth stagnated (Troupin, Steen & Stroobants, 2015). The deficit problem further intensified 
when Belgium entered the Excessive Deficit Procedure of the European Union,13 when rating 
agencies such as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s downgraded the country’s credit rating 
(Piron, 2013) and when the bank Dexia requested another bailout (Troupin et al., 2015). 
The importance of autonomy questions in a country shaped by bipolarism is another 
reason why fiscal consolidation in federal Belgium is subject to a collective action. The 
federalization of the country was an attempt to appease the overlapping socio-economic and 
linguistic cleavages dividing the Belgian state into an economically well-performing Dutch-
speaking North and a French-speaking South struggling with the consequences of economic 
structural change after the decline of the mining sector (Deschouwer, 2012; Deschouwer & 
Reuchamps, 2013). Since 1993, Belgium has officially been a federal state consisting of three 
Communities (Flemish, French and German) and three Regions (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels-
Capital Region).14 The structural conflict dividing the country remains unsolved (see Benz, 
2016) as the different state reforms transforming the country piece by piece into a federal and 
decentralized state (Dardanelli, 2017; Matagne, Dandoy & Van Wynsberghe, 2013) and the 
regionalization of the partisan system (Deschouwer, 2012) show. Therefore, autonomy is a 
particularly sensitive issue. It intensifies the collective action problem of fiscal consolidation 
because the reduction of deficits and debts demands significantly more efforts in Wallonia, 
the Brussels-Capital Region, as well as in the French-speaking and German-speaking 
Communities compared with Flanders. This is explained by the differences in the economic 
performance of these parts of the country (Pagano, 2007). While Flanders tends to achieve 
budget surpluses, the other constituent units have been running deficits most of the time 
(Bisciari & Van Meensel, 2012; Verdonck & Deschouwer, 2003). Consequently, they are much 
more dependent on federal transfers (including fiscal equalization), whereas Flanders has 
always been a net payer.  
                                                      
13  https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-
governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/stability-and-growth-pact/corrective-arm-excessive-deficit-
procedure/closed-excessive-deficit-procedures/belgium_en [accessed on 12.02.2018]. 
14 Note that the Flemish Region and the Community have merged in 1980.  
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5 Fiscal Consolidation in Belgium 
In contrast to federal countries that have introduced a legislated fiscal rule, Belgium relies on 
annual fiscal targets that are submitted to the European authorities as part of the country’s 
Convergence/Stability Programmes (Bogaert et al., 2006; Hallerberg, 2000; Schaechter et al., 
2012). Furthermore, the sixth state reform decentralized a share of the federal deficit. This 
constitutes a further budget constraint for the Communities and Regions (Decoster & Sas, 
2013; IMF, 2014; Troupin et al., 2015). The Special Finance Act, as amended in 2014, left the 
constituent units underfinanced, because there was a gap between their new spending 
responsibilities and their revenues (including federal transfers). Furthermore, the amended 
act required the Communities and Regions to participate in pre-financing the costs of the 
ageing population from 2015 onwards by contributing to the pensions of their civil servants, 
until then covered by the federal government. This contribution will increase from 0.5% of 
GDP in 2018 to 0.21% of GDP in 2030 (Bisciari & Van Meensel, 2012). The contribution of the 
Communities and Regions to the pensions of their civil servants was expected to liberate funds 
in the federal government’s budget that would be used to prefund the costs of the ageing 
society.15 Yet the decentralization of a share of the federal deficit increased the budget deficits 
of the constituent units, which required them to make additional consolidation efforts 
(Decoster & Sas, 2013, 2015; Jennes, 2014).16 
By depicting how fiscal rules and similar consolidation measures are developed, the 
following sections examine whether the annual fiscal targets and the decentralization of a 
share of the federal deficit in the context of the sixth state reform were imposed by the federal 
government and discuss the Communities’ and Regions’ disposition to accept these 
constraints on their budgets.  
 
                                                      
15 Jennes (2014) even calls the decentralization of a share of the federal deficit an implicit bailout of the federal 
government. 
16  This was not the first time such mechanisms were used to transfer a share of the federal deficit to the 
constituent units. The redistribution of VAT and PIT revenues under the Special Finance Act of 1989, for example, 
was designed in a way that left the newly transferred responsibilities underfunded during a transition period by 
coupling its growth rate with inflation but not economic growth (Bethuyne, 2005; Jennes, 2014). Moreover, 3% 
of general government debt was transferred to the constituent units as indirect debt (Bethuyne, 2005).  
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5.1 Negotiating Fiscal Discipline 
The development of annual fiscal targets has been delegated to the HCF in 1989 (article 49 (6) 
and (7) of the Special Finance Act).17 Consequently, the federal government does not impose 
budget constraints on the constituent units, but the Public Borrowing Requirements Section 
of the HCF establishes the individual fiscal targets for the federal government, each 
Community and each Region. Given that the use of the federal government’s right to 
temporarily limit constituent unit borrowing is politically not feasible, the governments of 
both levels are thus subject to the same constraints on their budgetary discretion. 
Furthermore, the delegation of the development of fiscal targets to the HCF has been decided 
by the regional parties forming the federal government in 1989. The third state reform was 
part of the coalition agreement of the Flemish (Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V), 
Socialistische Partij Anders (SPA), Volksunie) and French-speaking parties (Parti Socialiste (PS), 
Parti Social Chrétien (PSC)) that also governed in the Regions and Communities. Not only did 
the amendment of the Special Finance Act to formalize the delegation of fiscal target 
development to the HCF require the consent of two-thirds of the members of parliament, but 
these members also had to represent the (simple) majority of both Dutch and French 
speakers. The Public Borrowing Requirements Section was then established by Royal Decree 
adopted by the federal coalition government as requested by the Special Finance Act (Installé, 
Peffer & Savage, 1989). Hence, not only has the development of fiscal targets been delegated 
to a (semi-)independent body, but the decision to delegate this task to the HCF has been made 
by the regional parties that constitute the federal government. To underline their 
commitment to respecting those targets, the federal government and the constituent units 
sometimes negotiate cooperation agreements that formalize the fiscal targets recommended 
by the Public Borrowing Requirements Section of the HCF.18 These agreements are prepared 
at meetings of the Interministerial Conference ‘Public Finance and Budgeting’.19 They are then 
                                                      
17 Note that between 2004 and 2006, agreement on the membership of the HCF was not reached. Therefore the 
Council did not issue recommendations until March 2007 (Coene & Langenus, 2013). However, the targets 
recommended in 2004 for the years 2005 to 2010 still applied. 
18 Cooperation agreements between the federal government and the Communities and Regions were signed in 
1996, 1999, 2000, 2005 and 2013 (see Piron, 2013). 
19 Interministeriële Conferentie van Financiën en Begroting (ICFB) in Dutch, Conférence Interministérielle des 
Finances et du Budget (CIFB) in French. 
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approved by the Deliberation Committee,20  which consists of the prime ministers of the 
federal government and the constituent units. 
Similar to the fiscal targets, the decentralization of a share of the federal deficit has 
not been imposed on the Communities and the Regions. The decisions to underfinance the 
newly transferred spending responsibilities and to increase the contribution of the constituent 
units to the pensions of the civil servants were the results of a coalition agreement signed by 
the regional parties forming the federal government under Elio di Rupo (PS).21 While the PS, 
the Mouvement Réformateur (MR) and the Centre démocrate humaniste (cdH) represented 
the French-speaking part of the country, the CD&V, the SPA and the Open Vlaamse Liberalen 
en Democraten (OpenVLD) ensured the representation of Flemish interests and preferences. 
Although governments across the levels were slightly incongruent,22 these measures could 
not have been adopted without the consent of the representatives of the two language 
groups. The decentralization of a share of the federal deficit in 2014, similar to 1989, thus 
constitutes a compromise of the regional parties and representatives of the two major 
linguistic communities constituting the country (Bisciari & Van Meensel, 2012; Decoster & Sas, 
2013; Piron, 2013). Consequently, the regionalization of the party system and the composition 
of the federal executive effectively protect the constituent units from asymmetric losses of 
autonomy.  
 
5.2 Accepting Fiscal Discipline: The Cooperation of the Constituent Units 
As Bethuyne (2005) finds, the Communities and Regions generally accept and respect the 
annual fiscal targets developed by the HCF. The cooperation agreements signed occasionally 
by the federal government and the constituent units based on the recommendations of the 
HCF confirm this finding (voir Van Meensel & Dury, 2008). The HCF has a good reputation in 
the eyes of the different governments on both levels (Bogaert et al., 2006), which Hallerberg 
(2000, p. 30) links to the inclusion of experts of the National Bank in the Council. His 
                                                      
20 Overlegcomité in Dutch, Comité de Concertation in French. 
21 Coalition Agreement, 11 December 2011 
(https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/searchlist/Accord_de_Gouvernement_1er_decembre_2011.p
df, accessed on 26 March 2018). 
22 N-VA and Ecolo were part of the coalition governments in Flanders and Wallonia, respectively, but 
not of the federal coalition, whereas the MR joined the federal coalition but was not represented in executives 
on the constituent unit level. 
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interviewees identified the central bankers as ‘the key players’ of the Public Borrowing Section 
and as ‘impartial brokers’. Given the HCF’s good reputation, federal decision makers and 
policymakers in the constituent units consider the fiscal targets to be binding even in the 
absence of cooperation agreements. This is indicated by their inclusion in the 
Convergence/Stability Programmes (Bethuyne, 2005) and the references to them in the 
annual budgets of the different entities composing the Belgian federation (Deschamps, 1994, 
p. 136; Hallerberg, 2000, p. 30).23 Hence, because of the good reputation of the HCF (Coene & 
Langenus, 2013, p. 144) and given the expertise of its members, the Council’s 
recommendations do not need to be legally binding to be accepted by the constituent units. 
Even though Flanders, for example, occasionally complained that there was a lack of effort 
from the other constituent units to reduce their deficits and debts,24 it has never openly 
contested the recommendations of the HCF. This suggests that the Communities and Regions 
accept the annual fiscal targets developed by the HCF. The acceptance of the HCF’s 
recommendation is also indicated by the fact that the share of constituent units’ debt in 
general government debt has remained relatively small over time.25 
Similarly, the Communities and Regions have accepted to assume the share of the 
federal deficit that the sixth state reform transferred to them, even though this decision limits 
their budgetary leeway, at least in the short run: while they were given underfunded spending 
responsibilities, the constituent units still have to comply with the fiscal targets. This 
consolidation measure was acceptable to the Communities and Regions because it was based 
on projections and scenarios developed by the HCF (Pagano, 2007). The Public Borrowing 
Requirements Section frequently emphasized the importance of consolidation in prefunding 
the costs of an ageing society. It advised governments on both levels to undertake additional 
consolidation efforts. The Section not only called for more fiscal discipline, but also insisted 
that the federal government was unable to prefund the costs of the country’s ageing society 
on its own (see Frogneux & Saintrain, 2013; OECD, 2011). Therefore, it encouraged the federal 
government and the constituent units to reach an agreement on the distribution of the costs 
of the ageing society among the different levels of government. Once this political agreement 
                                                      
23 See, for example: 
http://gouvernement.wallonie.be/files/Documents/Budget/Communiqu%C3%A9%20de%20presse_aju%20201
8.pdf [accessed on 22 July 2018]. 
24 « Dewael : ‘Je ne renégocie jamais un accord’ », Le Soir 9.12.2000, p. 3. 
25 See IMF Government Finance Statistics. 
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was established in 2011, when the coalition agreement of the Di Rupo (federal) government 
was signed, the Public Borrowing Requirements Section of the HCF published a report (March 
2012) in which it underlined the need to prefund the costs of the ageing society that would 
not only require further consolidation measures. It also insisted that the participation of the 
constituent units should be increased and recommended the transfer of a certain share of the 
federal deficit to them (see Frogneux & Saintrain, 2013). The decision to underfund the new 
spending responsibilities of the Communities and Regions and to increase their contribution 
to the pensions of their civil servants was based on recommendations and estimates of the 
HCF’s Study Group on Ageing (established in 2001). Even though these measures have not 
been developed by the HCF itself, they were largely inspired by the recommendations of the 
HCF and its different committees. Therefore, the agreement within the federal coalition 
government in 2011 on the contribution of the constituent units to civil servants’ pensions 
went beyond the specific interests of individual governments on the different levels and was 
built on consensus. Hence, the role of HCF not only explains why the Communities and Regions 
accepted annual fiscal targets, but also elucidates their willingness to accept a higher 
contribution to fiscal consolidation in the context of the sixth state reform.  
 
Despite Belgium’s tightly coupled fiscal regime, the high levels of deficits and debts 
and the importance of autonomy issues in a divided country, the collective action problem of 
fiscal consolidation has thus been resolved.26 
The development of fiscal targets and the decentralization of a share of the federal 
deficit indicate that the regionalization of the party system makes decisions of the federal 
government contingent on the agreement of the representatives of regional parties, which 
protects the autonomy of the constituent units. Furthermore, these examples confirm that 
the HCF indeed constitutes a distinct arena in which fiscal consolidation measures are 
prepared through what Benz (2016) calls arguing, which increases the acceptability of 
decisions that are then formalized in the political arena, i.e. when federal governments are 
formed, when budget announcements are made and when the Deliberation Committee 
formally adopts them. 
                                                      
26 Moreover, the public finances of the federation have considerably improved despite a significant setback 
during the global financial crisis (IMF, 2014; Van Meensel & Dury, 2008; Wagschal & Wenzelburger, 2008). 
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Nevertheless, several external factors increased the willingness of the Communities 
and Regions to accept limits on their deficits and debts. First, in the 1990s, the EMU pressured 
Belgium to reduce its deficits and debts, as a condition for participation. Fiscal consolidation 
in the 1990s was largely motivated by the prospect of EMU membership in addition to the aim 
of prefunding the costs of an ageing society and of avoiding a snowball effect (Hallerberg, 
2000; Husson & Steylaers, 1999; Piron, 2013). When Belgium entered the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure in the 2000s, this external pressure to reduce deficits and debts intensified. Second, 
the credit downgrading by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s was an important factor in the 
agreement on a sixth state reform, which led to the formation of a new federal coalition 
government in 2011 (Troupin et al., 2015). Third, that the federal government assumed the 
largest consolidation burden since fiscal consolidation started has significantly reduced the 
consolidation pressure on the constituent units. Despite the decentralization of revenues by 
the different state reforms, the bulk of budget deficits and public debt remained on the 
federal level (Bethuyne, 2005). Besides, the federal government agreed not to cut 
discretionary transfers during economic downturns (Hallerberg, 2000). This facilitated the 
constituent units’ acceptance of fiscal targets. Moreover, it increased their willingness to 
strengthen their contribution by taking over a share of the federal deficit (Bogaert & Père, 
2001; OECD, 2001; Piron, 2013, p. 164, 2014). 
6 Conclusions 
Federal states face a collective action problem in relation to the consolidation of public 
finances, especially if they have a tightly coupled fiscal regime. The reduction of general 
government deficits and debts requires the participation of both levels of government. Hence, 
the introduction of fiscal rules is a crucial moment for the stability of a federal system for two 
reasons. First, if the constituent units expect the federal government to bail them out in the 
event of a fiscal crisis, they may seek to avoid the constraints that fiscal rules represent for 
their discretion to spend. Second, to avoid having to bail them out, the federal government 
can decide to impose a fiscal rule on the federated entities. The constituent units’ refusal to 
cooperate and federal imposition threaten the ever-fragile balance of power on which federal 
states are built. Thus, fiscal consolidation can lead to tensions in federal relations. In Belgium, 
high levels of deficits and debts coupled with the structural conflict between Dutch speakers 
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and French speakers exacerbate this collective action problem. Nevertheless, the collective 
action problem was resolved: the federal government has not imposed a fiscal rule on the 
Communities and the Regions, and the constituent units have consented to participate in the 
reduction of deficits and debts.  
By examining the development of annual fiscal targets and the decentralization of a 
share of the federal deficit in the context of the sixth state reform in 2011, this article 
advanced two explanations for the resolution of the collective action problem with regard to 
fiscal consolidation in Belgium. First, the regionalization of the party system and its impact on 
the composition of the federal government minimized the risk of federal encroachment, at 
least until 2014. Second, the HCF ensured the cooperation of the federated entities. The 
literature on dynamic federalism has claimed that the party system protects the constituent 
units’ autonomy vis-à-vis the federal government if it is integrated and decentralized. The 
Belgian case shows that the party system can safeguard the constituent units’ autonomy also 
when it is regionalized. If regional(ist) parties form the federal government, the latter is less 
distinct from the constituent units than in other federations, especially when governments 
are congruent. Decisions taken on the federal level are compromises of representatives of 
regional parties. Therefore, the risk of federal imposition is significantly smaller. But the 
regionalization of the party system is only one of two necessary conditions for the resolution 
of the collective action problem. The fact that the development of fiscal targets was delegated 
to the HCF and that the decision to decentralize a share of the federal deficit was based on 
the Council’s recommendations and advice increased the Communities’ and the Regions’ 
willingness to embrace fiscal discipline. The reason is that the HCF ensures the rationalization 
of fiscal consolidation whereby arguing and consensus building prevail over the individual 
interests and preferences of the federal government and the federated entities.  
Nevertheless, the acceptance of fiscal discipline by the constituent units was facilitated 
by the fact that the federal government bore the main consolidation burden. Therefore, fiscal 
consolidation required significantly less efforts from them compared with the federal 
government. Besides, the fact that the HCF develops targets for the federal government, each 
Community and each Region separately increases their individual responsibilities, putting 
pressure on each constituent unit to keep its finances in order to avoid being criticized by the 
HCF. Hence, the context of fiscal consolidation in Belgium is not very different from the way 
fiscal rules are introduced in federations with a loosely coupled fiscal regime where the 
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collective action problem is less pronounced because the costs of overborrowing are 
internalized. Similar to the Canadian provinces or the US states, compliance with fiscal targets 
is an individual responsibility of the Belgian Communities and the Regions. This increases the 
pressure on each federated entity to cooperate. However, the HCF can recommend a 
budgetary surplus in Flanders, for example, to compensate deficits on Wallonia or the 
Brussels-Capital Region in the general government budget. It is to be expected that the 
individual responsibilities of the different governments of the Belgian federation will increase 
if future rounds of state reforms further decentralize fiscal autonomy. 
The regionalization of the party system and the role of independent fiscal councils are 
effective mechanisms to solve the collective action problem with regard to fiscal consolidation 
in federal states. Even though the HCF is a specific characteristic of Belgian federalism, as is 
the way the party system evolved, the resolution of the collective action problem of fiscal 
consolidation in Belgium emphasizes the importance of compromising and consensus building 
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